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or deemed it amended if the sole error*had been the failure to
allege corporate status.
The practitioner should note that, although the court reversed
the order granting the motion, it did so with leave to renew the
motion on proper papers. It appears that the court was motivated
by the cumulative effect of the errors rather than by their individual
importance.
CollateralEstoppel: Unavailable to party where issue in subsequent
suit was similar but not identical to that previously determined.
While res judicata serves to prevent the relitigation of a particular cause of action where there has been a final judgment on
the merits, collateral estoppel insures that issues previously litigated
and determined will be conclusive in a subsequent suit involving
different causes of action or parties."18 Both are doctrines of repose
and, although closely related, are technically distinct. For example,
if A sues B for negligence and recovers, the doctrine of res judicata
will bar any subsequent suit by A against B on the same cause of
action. However, if, in the subsequent suit, A sues B on a
different cause of action, but one in which an issue is identical
with one in the previous suit, res judicata would not apply. Here,
the doctrine of collateral estoppel would be used -to preclude a
ielitigation of the issue.
Previously, the courts generally imposed a requirement of
mutuality upon one seeking to interpose the doctrine of collateral
§toppel. "It is a principle of general elementary law that the
estoppel of a judgment must be mutual." "'9 This connotes that
ihe party seeking to invoke the estoppel must have been either a
party or privy to the suit in which the judgment was rendered. 2 0
Subject to several exceptions, 21 the rule of mutuality was adhered
to by22 the New York courts until the case of Israel v. Wood Dolson
Co.'

was decided in 1956.

In Israel, the Court of Appeals allowed a defendant who had
not been a party to the prior action to assert the previous determination of an issue in a subsequent suit. Rather than merely
establishing a new exception to the rule of mutuality the Court
stated that:
(Sup. Ct Albany County 1964); Hewitt

v. Maass, 41 Misc. 2d 894, 246

N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1964).
11s McKinney's Sess. Law News, June 25, 1965, A-262.
"19 Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111,

1272 (1912).
1o
See 1B Mooan, FDERAL PRAcICE, f 0.412[1], at 1801 (2d ed. 1965).
21
'
See id. at 0.412[3], at 1813.
122 1 N.Y2d 116, 134 N.E2d 97, 151 N.Y.S2d 1 (1956).
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Our holding here is not to be treated as adding another general class of
cases to the list of 'exceptions' to the -rule requiring mutuality of estoppel.
It is merely the announcement of the underlying principle which is found in
the cases classed as 'exceptions' to the mutuality rule. .
. [T]his court
recognized that in determining the applicability of the doctrine of res124
judicata' 23
as a defense, the test to be applied is that of 'identity of issues.

Therefore, the courts need not rely upon the "exceptions" to the
mutuality rule, but may apply the "identity of issues" test as the
sole determinant of whether or not to impose collateral estoppel.
Thus far, it appears that the courts of New York are not ready
to apply the Israel doctrine to cases in which the estoppel is sought
to be used affirmatively. 12 5
Opponents of the mutuality requirement believe that the only
necessary limitation on the conclusive force of a judgment is that
the person sought to be bound must have had his day in court.
Therefore, if A obtains a judgment against B and subsequently
attempts to use it against X, who was neither party nor privy to
the previous litigation, X is not bound because he has not had his
day in court. However, in subsequent litigation between X and B,
B has had his day in court on the issue with A and there is no
valid reason why X cannot use A's judgment
to preclude B from
126
relitigating issues previously determined.
However, those favoring mutuality contend that although B
has had his day in court with respect to A he has had no opportunity to be heard in opposition27 to X and, therefore, has been
denied his opportunity to litigate.1
The argument in favor of mutuality appears to ignore the
underlying assumption in the anti-mutuality view, viz., that the
issue in both cases is identical. They are identical in so far as the
issue determined in the prior action is essential to the determination
of the subsequent action. For example, if X and Y, passengers in a
car driven by A, are injured as a result of the alleged negligence
of driver B, a recovery by X against B would indicate that Y
should also recover against B without a relitigation of B's negligence.
If there is any question as to the identity of the issues Y would not
be permitted to employ collateral estoppel. 28
23 Although the court used the term "res judicata" it is evident from the
rest of the discussion that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is that to which
it was referring.
224 Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 120, 134 N.E.2d 97, 99-100,
151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1956).
125 See Justice Halpern's concurring opinion in Ordway v. White, 14 App.
Div. 2d 498, 217 N.Y.S.2d 334 (4th Dep't 1961).
228 lB MooRs, op. cit. supra note 120, f 0.412[l], at 1808.
2
1 7
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Ibid.
Ibid.; see Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bei-

hard Doctrine, 9 STAr. L. REV. 281 (1957).
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1 20
an interesting factual situation was
In Cummings v. Dresher,
presented for the investigation of the relative merits of these points
of view. Here, A, B, and X were involved in an automobile
accident. X; a passenger in the car A was driving, and A brought
separate suits which were tried jointly against B in federal court.
A was denied recovery because of his contributory negligence.
The jury also concluded, albeit gratuitously, that B was negligent.
X recovered in his action against B when the jury found B
negligent. Subsequently, B commenced an action against A in the
New York Supreme Court on facts arising from the same accident.
The Appellate Division, Third Department, held that A could not
assert the defense of collateral estoppel against B since, in the
action of A against B the jury's finding as to B's negligence was
"gratuitous" and, in the action by X against B, the factors required
for a passenger to recover against another car "are not the same
as those required by the driver of his car." 130
The court's reasoning in regard to the jury's "gratuitous"
holding in the prior litigation seems to be on firm ground. Since
the jury had found that A was contributorily negligent, it need
never have reached the question of B's alleged negligence. This
thesis is amply supported by the authorities.18 1
The court's position on the second point appears to rest upon
more tenuous ground. The Israel case, in effect, seems to abolish
mutuality as a requirement for the defensive assertion of collateral
estoppel 13 and substitutes therefore the identity of issues test.
The court in Cummings seemed to be of the opinion that the
issue involved in the prior litigation was not the same as the one
involved herein. It is difficult to perceive, without help by way
of example from the court, a situation in which the driver of a car
would be negligent as to the passenger of another car and not be
concurrently negligent as to the driver.
A differentiation of issues can be drawn in the Cummings
case, but it would appear to be based solely upon technical grounds
and not to address itself to the practicalities of the situation. If X
(passenger), sues B (driver of the other car), the issues are
essentially: 1) X's freedom from contributory negligence; -and 2) B's
negligence. However, if B sues A (X's driver) the issues are:
1) B's freedom from contributory negligence; and 2) A's negligence.
Thus, it is apparent that the issues, although technically and defini-

12924 App. Div. 2d 912, 264 N.Y.S.2d 430 (3d Dep't 1965), affirming 43
Misc. 2d 556, 251 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1964).
130Id, at 913, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 431.
1s, Purpora v. Coney Island Dairy Prods. Corp., 262 App. Div. 908, 28
N.Y.S.2d 1008 (2d Dep't 1941).
232 Civoru v. National Broadcasting Co., 261 F2d 716, 718 (2d Cir. 1958).
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tionally distinct,1 33 are substantially the same. Practically speaking,
B's negligence in the first action would most assuredly be his
contributory negligence in the second. Since the issue in the two
cases is essentially the same, it would seem that the court should
have allowed A to assert the defense of collateral estoppel. In
addition, this view might be further supported by taking into
account the jury's gratuitous holding as to B's negligence. Although
as the cases indicate, this would not, in and of itself, be a basis for
the employment of collateral estoppel, it does lend support for the
use of estoppel in this case. Since the modern liberal procedures
on counterclaims will assure a day in court, the use of collateral
estoppel in situations such as the one described might have the
benefit of consolidating suits and reducing congested court calendars.
On the other hand, it is important to note certain practical
considerations which might have adversely motivated the court. If
the defense of collateral estoppel had been permitted herein, it is
quite possible that injustices might result in numerous other situations. For example, if a bus containing forty passengers were to
crash, injuring them, a suit by one passenger which was decided
in favor of the bus company woxld automatically preclude the other
thirty-nine. Thus, it is possible to envision the possibility of
collusive suits. Moreover, an unreasonable burden might be placed
upon those who decided to wait and to investigate the nature and
extent of their injuries. Although these practical considerations
probably influenced the court, the alternative conclusion, viz., the
application of collateral estoppel and the prevention of repetitious
litigation, seems preferable.
The practitioner should note, however, that although this case
does not apply the mutuality requirement that was abolished in
Israel, it does reveal that the courts will probably closely scrutinize
and investigate the issues involved in light of the practical consequences of permitting collateral estoppel.
ARTICLE
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TRIAL BY A JURY

Motion to frame issues for jury trial abolished.

In Brown z,. Brown, 34 a divorce action, petitioner utilized CPA
procedure in an attempt to obtain a jury trial by applying to the
court for an order framing the issues.1 35 In refusing to grant
petitioner's application, the court noted that application for an
order formulating the issues to be tried by a jury was a cumbersome
procedure which has been abolished in the CPLR.
133
134

See PnossLR, ToRTs § 64, at 427-30 (3d ed. 1964).

47 Misc. 2d 1046, 263 N.Y.S2d 717 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).

135 CPA § 429.

